Santa Clara Law

Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Litigation

Research Projects and Empirical Data

1-1-2011

Florida v. HHS - Amicus Brief of CATO Institute
CATO Institute

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca
Part of the Health Law Commons
Automated Citation
CATO Institute, "Florida v. HHS - Amicus Brief of CATO Institute" (2011). Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Litigation. Paper
136.
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca/136

This Amicus Brief is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Projects and Empirical Data at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Litigation by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067
IN THE
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
________________________
STATE OF FLORIDA, by and through Attorney General Pam Bondi, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
________________________
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF THE CATO INSTITUTE
SUPPORTING PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES AND AFFIRMANCE
Ilya Shapiro
Counsel of Record
David H. Rittgers
CATO INSTITUTE
1000 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 842-0200
ishapiro@cato.org
Counsel for Amicus Curiae

State of Florida et al. v. Department of Health and Human Services 11-11021 & 11-11067

CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 26.1 and Eleventh Cir. R. 26.1-1, the Cato
Institute declares that it is a nonprofit public policy research foundation dedicated
in part to the defense of constitutional liberties secured by law. Cato states that it
has no parent corporation and only issues a handful of shares that are privately held
by its directors. No publicly held corporation has a direct financial interest in the
outcome of this litigation due to the participation of Cato.
Further, the undersigned counsel certifies that, in addition to the list of
interested persons certified in the Appellants’ Brief and supplemented by the
certificates in the Briefs of the State Appellees-Cross-Appellants and the Private
Plaintiffs-Appellees, the following persons may have an interest in the outcome of
this case, and that to the best of his knowledge, the list of persons and entities in
the Briefs for Appellants and Appellees are otherwise complete:
ASSOCIATIONS
Cato Institute

COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE
Ilya Shapiro
David H. Rittgers
OTHER PERSONS
Trevor Burrus
Robert A. Levy
Roger Pilon
Timothy Sandefur

_____________________
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
C-1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS AND CORPORATE
DISCLOSURE STATEMENTS..................................................................C-1
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... iii
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ...........................................................................1
ISSUE ADDRESSED BY AMICUS CURIAE ..........................................................1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT .................................................................................2
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................5
I.

The Individual Mandate Exceeds the Scope of the Necessary and Proper
Clause as Used to Execute the Power to Regulate Interstate Commerce
Under the “Substantial Effects” Doctrine........................................................5
A. The “Substantial Effects” Doctrine Applies the Necessary and Proper
Clause to the Commerce Power and Allows Congress to Use Its
Regulatory Authority While Cabining That Authority. .............................5
B. Regulating Inactivity Transcends the Necessary and Proper Clause's
Limits on the Commerce Clause ..............................................................12

II.

The Individual Mandate Cannot Be Justified as an “Essential Part of a
Broader Regulatory Scheme” Because Congress Cannot Regulate
Inactivity ........................................................................................................14
A. Congress Cannot Compel Activity as Part of a Broader Economic
Scheme......................................................................................................14
B. Inactivity Is Not a Type of Activity..........................................................21

III.

The Individual Mandate Constitutes a “Commandeering of the People”
That Is Not “Proper” Under the Necessary and Proper Clause.....................23

CONCLUSION........................................................................................................28
i

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE.......................................................................30
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ...............................................................................31

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Constitutional Provisions
U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.......................................................................................25
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.....................................................................................24
U.S. Const. amend. III .............................................................................................26
U.S. Const. amend. V...............................................................................................26
U.S. Const. amend. VI .............................................................................................25
U.S. Const. amend. VII ............................................................................................25
U.S. Const. amend. IX .............................................................................................26
U.S. Const. amend. X...............................................................................................24
U.S. Const. amend. XIII...........................................................................................26
U.S. Const. amend. XVI ..........................................................................................25

Cases
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967) .....................................................................25
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999)
(en banc), aff’d sub nom United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).....9
Champion v. Anderson, 188 U.S. 321 (1903)..........................................................13
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793)............................................. 24-25
United States v. Duran, 596 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2010).........................................22
Florida v. United States Dept. of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91RV/EMT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011)...........3, 19
iii

Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 540 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2008)........ 7-8
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)........................................................6
*Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)............................................................ passim
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)........................12
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937)...................................................................4
Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870) ...............................................27
Ironworkers Local Union 68 & Participating Emplrs. Health & Welfare
Funds v. AstraZeneca Pharms., LP, No. 08-16851, 2011 U.S. App.
LEXIS 4960 (11th Cir. Mar. 11, 2011) .........................................................22
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) .......................................................12
Mead v. Holder, No. 10-950 (GK), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592
(D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011) ..............................................................................3, 21
*McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) .............................5, 6, 17
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)...............................................23, 27
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) ................................9, 12
*Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) ............................................ 17, 23-24
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) ...................................................25
Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp.2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010).........3
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) ......................................................6, 20
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).............................................1, 17
*United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) ................................................ passim
*United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) .......................................... passim
iv

Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598 (E.D. Va. 2010).....................................29
Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768 (E.D. Va. 2010).......................................2
*Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11 (1942) ...................................................4, 6, 7, 12
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) ...............................................................25
Other Authorities
Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health
Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional,
5 N.Y.U. J.L.L. 581 (2011) .................................................................7, 12, 24
J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 581 (2002) .....................................................................11
Cong. Budget Office, The Budgetary Treatment of an Individual Mandate to
Buy Health Insurance (1994) ..........................................................................4
The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961)...........26
Philippa Foot, Killing and Letting Die, in Moral Dilemmas (2002) .......................22
Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank
(February 23, 1791), in Legislative and Documentary History of the
Bank of The United States 98 (H. St. Clair & D.A. Hall eds., reprinted
Augustus M. Kelley 1967) (1832).................................................................10
Jason Mazzone, Can Congress Force You to Be Healthy? N.Y. Times,
Dec. 16, 2010, at A39 ....................................................................................16
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§§ 1501(a)(1)-(2), 124 Stat. 119 (2010) ....................................................2, 19
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts (5th ed. 1984)..........................................21
Ilya Shapiro, State Suits Against Health Reform Are Well Grounded in Law—
and Pose Serious Challenges, 29 Health Affairs 1229 (June 2010) .............29

v

INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 1
The Cato Institute was established in 1977 as a nonpartisan public policy
research foundation dedicated to advancing the principles of individual liberty, free
markets, and limited government. Cato’s Center for Constitutional Studies was
established in 1989 to promote the principles of limited constitutional government
that are the foundation of liberty. Toward those ends, Cato publishes books and
studies, conducts conferences, and publishes the annual Cato Supreme Court
Review. It also files amicus briefs with the courts, including in cases focusing on
the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause such as United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), and
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). The present case centrally
concerns Cato because it represents the federal government’s most egregious
attempt to exceed its constitutional powers.

ISSUE ADDRESSED BY AMICUS CURIAE
Whether the “individual mandate” provision of the Affordable Care Act is a
valid exercise of Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause and the
Necessary and Proper Clause.
1

Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29, both parties, through their respective counsel,
have consented to the filing of this brief. Amicus certifies that no counsel for any
party authored this brief in whole or in part, that no counsel or party made a
monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.
1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The individual mandate goes beyond Congress’s power to regulate interstate
commerce under existing doctrine. The outermost bounds of the Supreme Court’s
Commerce Clause jurisprudence—the “substantial effects” doctrine—prevent
Congress from reaching intrastate non-economic activity regardless of whether it
substantially affects interstate commerce. Nor under existing law can Congress
compel an inactive person to participate in commerce even if it purports to do so
pursuant to a broader regulatory scheme.
The Constitution does not permit Congress to conscript citizens into
economic transactions in order to remedy the admitted shortcomings (which the
government usually terms “necessities”) of a hastily assembled piece of legislation.
Although the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to execute its
regulatory authority over interstate commerce, it is not a blank check permitting
Congress to ignore constitutional limits by manufacturing necessities. “Salutatory
goals and creative drafting have never been sufficient to offset an absence of
enumerated powers.” Virginia v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 780 (E.D. Va.
2010). The individual health insurance mandate is not constitutionally warranted
because it is “necessary” to make PPACA function properly. 2 Indeed, any law—

2

“PPACA” refers to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No.
111-148, §§ 1501(a)(1)-(2), 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
2

“necessary” or otherwise—that purports to compel otherwise inactive citizens to
engage in economic activity is unconstitutional.
While the government emphasizes the “uniqueness” of the health care
market and the wisdom of the legislation at issue, “this case is not about whether
the Act is wise or unwise legislation…in fact, it is not really about our health care
system at all. It is principally about our federalist system, and it raises very
important issues regarding the Constitutional role of the federal government.”
Florida v. United States Dept. of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91RV/EMT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *6 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).
Moreover, what Congress is attempting to do here is quite literally
unprecedented. As a district court ruling for the government recognized, “in every
Commerce Clause case presented thus far, there has been some sort of activity. In
this regard, the Health Care Reform Act arguably presents an issue of first
impression.” Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp.2d 882, 893 (E.D.
Mich. 2010). Or, as another district court upholding the mandate conceded: “As
previous Commerce Clause cases have all involved physical activity, as opposed to
mental activity, i.e. decision-making, there is little judicial guidance on whether the
latter falls within Congress’s power.” Mead v. Holder, No. 10-950 (GK), 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592, at *55 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011).

3

The Congressional Budget Office agrees: “The government has never
required people to buy any good or service as a condition of lawful residence in the
United States.” Cong. Budget Office, The Budgetary Treatment of an Individual
Mandate to Buy Health Insurance 1 (1994). Nor has the government ever before
imposed on every man and woman a civil penalty for declining to participate in the
marketplace. And never before have courts had to consider such a breathtaking
assertion of power under the Commerce Clause. Even in Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 11 (1942), the federal government claimed “merely” the power to regulate
what farmers grew, not to mandate that people become farmers, much less to force
people to purchase farm products. 3 Even if not purchasing health insurance is
considered an “economic activity”—which of course would mean that every aspect
of human life is economic activity—there is no legal basis for Congress to require
individuals to enter the marketplace to buy a particular good or service.
Amicus offers this brief to highlight that, although the substantial effects
doctrine is often conceived as a Commerce Clause doctrine, it actually interprets
the Necessary and Proper Clause in the context of the power to regulate interstate
commerce. Consequently, the limitations of this doctrine mark the existing limit
on the constitutional requirement that a law be “necessary” to the execution of the
3

So, too, in Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937), the federal government
successfully defended the constitutionality of the Social Security Act in part by
emphasizing that it did not compel economic activity. See id. at 621 (argument of
Mr. Jackson) (“No compliance with any scheme of federal regulation is involved.”)
4

commerce power under the Necessary and Proper Clause. Because economic
mandates do not fall under this existing doctrine, it is unconstitutional to impose
economic mandates on the people under the guise of regulating commerce.
Even if economic mandates are deemed “necessary,” however, they are not a
“proper” means of executing an enumerated power because they unconstitutionally
“commandeer” individuals. Economic mandates alter the constitutional structure
in an unprecedented way and thus do not “consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).

ARGUMENT
I.

The Individual Mandate Exceeds the Scope of the Necessary and
Proper Clause as Used to Execute the Power to Regulate Interstate
Commerce Under the “Substantial Effects” Doctrine
A. The “Substantial Effects” Doctrine Applies the Necessary and
Proper Clause to the Commerce Power and Allows Congress to
Use Its Regulatory Authority While Cabining That Authority
Since the New Deal, the Supreme Court has asked whether a particular

“economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce” when considering
whether it falls under Congress’s Commerce Clause power. Gonzalez v. Raich,
545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610
(2000) (in turn quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995)). The
New Deal cases in which the “substantial effects” doctrine was first developed,

5

however, found the authority for that doctrine not in the Commerce Clause itself
but in its execution via the Necessary and Proper Clause. Although prevailing
legal convention describes the New Deal cases as expanding the definition of the
word “commerce,” a closer examination shows that this definition remained
unchanged. Instead, the Court asked whether federal regulation of the activity in
question was a necessary and proper means of exercising the power to regulate
interstate commerce, because the regulated activity substantially affects that
commerce. Congress has never been allowed to go beyond that point.
In United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), for example, the Court
considered the power of Congress to “prohibit the employment of workmen in the
production of goods ‘for interstate commerce’ at other than prescribed wages and
hours.” Id. at 105. Rather than stretching the definition of “commerce,” the Court
focused on how congressional power “extends to those activities intrastate which
so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to
make regulation of them appropriate.” Id. The authority cited for this proposition
did not come from Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)—the
Commerce Clause case that the Court had cited throughout its opinion—but from
the foundational Necessary and Proper Clause case of McCulloch v. Maryland.
A year later, in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the Court used the
same reasoning—not that “commerce” was being redefined but that the challenged

6

measures were a necessary and proper means for regulating commerce as
historically understood. Like Darby, Wickard explicitly relies on the Necessary
and Proper Clause, citing McCulloch as authority for congressional power,
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 130, n.29—even if Roscoe Filburn’s personal production of
wheat “may not be regarded as commerce,” id. at 125. Thus, contrary to the
conventional academic view, Wickard did not expand the Commerce Clause to
include the power to regulate intrastate activity that, when aggregated,
substantially affects interstate commerce. Instead, “like Darby, Wickard is both a
Commerce Clause and a Necessary and Proper Clause case[,]” with the substantial
effects doctrine reaching Roscoe Filburn’s wheat growing via the Necessary and
Proper Clause. Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual
Health Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L.L. 581, 594 (2011).
The above reading of Supreme Court jurisprudence is not novel; this court
itself recently applied it. In Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 540 F.3d
1242 (11th Cir. 2008), this court found that a law limiting the liability of rental car
companies was a valid exercise of federal power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause as applied to the Commerce Clause. The court did not hold that the
“Commerce Clause per se” authorized the regulation of automobiles as
“instrumentalities of commerce.” Id. at 1250. Instead, it invoked the substantial
effects doctrine, which it described as allowing Congress to “regulate both

7

interstate and intrastate instances of th[e] activity, the latter being necessary and
proper to effective regulation of the former.” Id. at 1251. That power could only
be used, however, “[s]o long as the underlying economic activity the federal statute
aims to protect is within the commerce power[.]” Id. at 1252. In Garcia, the
economic activity of renting a car certainly qualified.
The Garcia court also affirmed that “the Supreme Court has made clear that
aggregation analysis is not always appropriate.” Id. at 1251. Namely, aggregation
is inappropriate—improper—when the connection between the intrastate activity
and the object of regulation (i.e., interstate commerce) is too attenuated. In United
States v. Lopez, for example, the Court found that aggregation could not apply
except with regard to “economic activity.” 514 U.S. at 560. “Even Wickard,
which is perhaps the most-far-reaching example of Commerce Clause authority
over intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that possession of a
gun in a school zone does not.” Id. And in United States v. Morrison, the Court
held that the gender-motivated violence regulated by the Violence Against Women
Act was not economic activity and thus had only an “indirect and remote” or
“attenuated” effect on interstate commerce. 529 U.S. at 608 (quoting Lopez, 514
U.S. at 556-57 (in turn quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,
37 (1937))), 615. As this Court recognized in Garcia, the Lopez and Morrison
decisions, like Wickard and Darby, refined the criteria for deciding whether

8

Congress’s means are necessary and proper to the end of regulating interstate
commerce, but did not redefine “commerce.” The Court clarified the substantial
effects doctrine by setting the regulation of intrastate economic activity (in certain
contexts) as the absolute limit of federal power under the Commerce and
Necessary and Proper Clauses.
Chief Justice Rehnquist described that limit on Congress’s power as follows:
“Where economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation
regulating that activity will be sustained.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560. Conversely,
non-economic activity cannot be regulated merely because it affects interstate
commerce through a “but-for causal chain,” or has, in the aggregate, “substantial
effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption.” Morrison, 529 U.S.
at 615. Instead, the object of regulation must have a “close” qualitative “relation to
interstate commerce,” not merely a substantial “quantitative” impact on the
national economy. NLRB, 301 U.S. at 37; Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic
Institute, 169 F.3d 820, 843 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), aff’d sub nom United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Adopting the distinction between economic and non-economic activity
allowed the Court to determine whether legislation is “necessary” under the
Necessary and Proper Clause without involving it in protracted, and arguably
impossible, attempts to evaluate that legislation’s “more or less necessity or

9

utility.” Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank
(February 23, 1791), in Legislative and Documentary History of the Bank of the
United States 98 (H. St. Clair & D.A. Hall eds., reprinted Augustus M. Kelley
1967) (1832). This Necessary and Proper Clause doctrine limits congressional
power when regulating intrastate economic activity to activities closely connected
to interstate commerce. Limiting the scope of “necessary” in such a way avoids
granting Congress what would be tantamount to a federal police power. See, e.g.,
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. Moreover, a power to regulate intrastate economic activity
that has a substantial affect on interstate commerce is not so broad as to obstruct or
supplant the states’ police powers.
In other words, to preserve the constitutional scheme of limited and
enumerated powers, the Court drew a judicially administrable line beyond which
Congress could not go in enacting “necessary” means to execute its power to
regulate interstate commerce. The substantial effects doctrine, as limited in Lopez
and Morrison, thus established the outer doctrinal bounds of “necessity” under the
Necessary and Proper Clause.
As Professor Randy Beck has explained, “[g]iven the close relationship
between intrastate and interstate economic activity, a statute regulating local
economic conduct will usually be calculated to accomplish an end legitimately
encompassed within the plenary congressional authority over interstate

10

commerce.” J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper
Clause, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 581, 625 (2002).

In short, regulating intrastate

economic activity can be a “necessary” means of regulating interstate commerce as
that term is understood under the Necessary and Proper Clause. The obvious
corollary is that regulating non-economic activity cannot be “necessary,”
regardless of its effect on interstate commerce. And a power to regulate inactivity
is even more remote from Congress’s power over interstate commerce.
Most recently, in Gonzales v. Raich, the Court found the cultivation of
marijuana to be an economic activity that Congress could prohibit as a necessary
and proper means of exercising of its commerce power. 545 U.S. at 22. Raich
explicitly adhered to the economic/non-economic distinction set out in Lopez and
Morrison.

As Justice Stevens wrote for the majority, “Our case law firmly

establishes Congress’s power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an
economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.”

Id. at 17 (emphasis added).

Raich, therefore, reaffirmed that

Congress’s ability to execute its commerce power through the Necessary and
Proper Clause reaches only economic activity that happens to be intrastate.
Raich also rejected the government’s contention that it was Angel Raich’s or
Roscoe Filburn’s non-purchase of a commodity traded interstate that brought their
personal cultivation under congressional power. See Barnett, supra, at 602-03.
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Instead, Justice Stevens invoked the Webster’s Dictionary definition of
“economics”—“the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities,”
Raich, 545 U.S. at 25—and thus refused to adopt sweeping theory the government
advances here, that non-participation in the marketplace is itself economic activity.
B. Regulating Inactivity Transcends the Necessary and Proper Clause’s
Limits to the Commerce Clause
There is no legal precedent interpreting the Necessary and Proper Clause or
the Commerce Clause as allowing Congress to compel activity in the guise of a
regulation of commerce. In Wickard, Roscoe Filburn was in the business of
growing wheat and thus voluntarily engaged in economic activity. See 317 U.S. at
114-15.

In NLRB, the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation was subject to

regulatory schemes because it voluntarily engaged in the economic activity of
steelmaking. NLRB, 301 U.S. at 26. The Civil Rights Cases concerned parties that
voluntarily chose to engage in the economic activity of operating a restaurant,
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296 (1964), or a hotel, Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243 (1964). And finally, in Raich,
Diane Monson and Angel Raich grew, processed, and consumed medicinal
marijuana—all voluntary activities that the Supreme Court characterizes as a
variety of “manufactur[ing].” See 545 U.S. at 22.
All these cases fall into two general categories. Id. at 35-38 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (discussing the “two general circumstances” in which “the regulation
12

of intrastate activities may be necessary to and proper for the regulation of
interstate commerce”—and limits thereto). First, if persons voluntarily engage in
economic activity, for example by starting a business or participating in
agriculture, manufacturing, or another commercial endeavor, Congress can
regulate the manner by which their activities are conducted as a necessary and
proper exercise of its power to regulate interstate commerce. Such regulation of
voluntary economic activity may include conditional mandates such as
recordkeeping requirements or public disclosures. But this doctrine has never
included compelling people to engage in the economic activity itself, for example,
by starting the business or by buying a product.
The second category, exemplified by Raich, concerns Congress’s power to
prohibit a particular kind of commerce altogether, such as that involving illegal
drugs. Beginning with the lottery case, Champion v. Anderson, 188 U.S. 321
(1903), the Court recognized that the commerce power included the power to
prohibit activities. In Raich, the Court found that Congress may prohibit wholly
intrastate instances of an activity as a “necessary” means of prohibiting a type of
interstate commerce.
Under either theory, however, although Congress can regulate or even
prohibit voluntary economic actions that substantially affect interstate commerce,
it cannot force people to undertake such actions—even if such actions, when
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voluntarily undertaken, would have been subject to regulation or prohibition. The
distinguishing characteristic between a legitimate regulation within the
constitutional scheme of enumerated powers, and a limitless federal police power
capable of compelling whatever behavior Congress sees fit, is whether a person
can, in principle, avoid federal regulations by choosing not to engage in the
regulated activity. No such option exists with regard to the individual mandate; it
cannot be avoided in principle. It is not, therefore, a regulation of commercial
activity, but an unprecedented command that individuals engage in commerce.

II.

The Individual Mandate Cannot be Justified as an “Essential Part of
a Broader Regulatory Scheme” because Congress Cannot Regulate
Inactivity
A. Congress Cannot Compel Activity as Part of a Broader Economic
Scheme
Unable to justify the individual mandate under existing Commerce Clause

and Necessary and Proper Clause doctrine (let alone the fallback taxing power
theories that we do not discuss here), the government has resorted to a new theory:
that the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to mandate economic
activity when doing so is an essential part of a broader regulatory scheme. In other
words, while not itself a regulation of interstate commerce, nor a regulation of
intrastate economic activity, nor even a regulation of intrastate non-economic

14

activity, the individual mandate is a necessary and proper means of exercising the
lawful ends of regulating the interstate health insurance industry.
The government’s theory rests on a sentence from Lopez and a concurring
opinion by Justice Scalia in Raich that actually only identified circumstances in
which Congress may reach wholly intrastate non-economic activity. See Raich,
545 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Our cases show that the regulation of
intrastate activities may be necessary to and proper for the regulation of interstate
commerce in two general circumstances.” (emphasis added)). The first of these
circumstances included the substantial effects doctrine, which he said is limited to
reaching intrastate economic activity. He then identified a second Necessary and
Proper Clause doctrine by which “Congress may regulate even non-economic local
activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more general regulation of
interstate commerce.” Id. at 37 (emphasis added). These precedents do not justify
mandating participation in commerce as part of a national economic plan.
Moreover, Congress lacks a general police power, as the Supreme Court has
repeatedly emphasized. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618-19 (quoting Lopez, 514
U.S. at 566 (“The Constitution ... withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police
power”); and Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584-585 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[W]e always
have rejected readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal power that
would permit Congress to exercise a police power”). Thus if the Commerce

15

Clause is interpreted as allowing Congress to mandate economic activity in service
of a broader national scheme, the government must still identify some limiting
principle. The distinction between economic and non-economic would obviously
provide no limit to this doctrine, because all human behaviors have some ultimate
economic consequences.

The whole purpose for Justice Scalia’s concurring

opinion was to question the usefulness of such a distinction in dealing with the
problems posed by Raich.
A more obvious line to draw is one between regulating activity—whether
economic or non-economic—and inactivity.

Such a distinction provides a

judicially administrable limiting principle with a minimum of judicial intrusion
into complicated political or economic analysis. It is also consistent with existing
precedent. In Lopez, the Court discussed reaching intrastate non-economic activity
when doing so is “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in
which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated.” 514 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added). In Raich, Justice Scalia proposed
that “Congress may regulate even non-economic local activity if that regulation is a
necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce.” 545 U.S. at 37
(emphasis added). Indeed, in his Raich opinion, Justice Scalia used the word
“activity” or “activities” 42 times. See Jason Mazzone, Can Congress Force You
to Be Healthy? N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2010, at A39. There is good reason to doubt
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that Justice Scalia—who has referred to the Necessary and Proper Clause as “the
last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action,” Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997) (Scalia, J.)—would ever extend his
proposed doctrine to reach inactivity. See also United States v. Comstock, 130 S.
Ct. 1949, 1983 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined in part by Scalia, J.).
Limiting Congress to regulating or prohibiting activity under both the
“substantial effects” and the “essential to a broader regulatory scheme” doctrines
would serve the same general purpose as the economic/non-economic distinction.
Such a formal limitation would assure that exercises of the Necessary and Proper
Clause to execute the commerce power would be truly incidental to that power and
not remote, or mere “pretext[s]” for “the accomplishment of objects not entrusted
to the government.” McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423. However imperfect,
some such line must be drawn to preserve Article I’s structure of limited and
enumerated powers. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(“Although the resolution of specific cases has proved difficult, we have derived
from the Constitution workable standards to assist in preserving separation of
powers and checks and balances.”). Because accepting the government’s theory in
this case would effectively demolish that structure, the government’s theory is
constitutionally unsatisfying.
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To date, the government has offered no limiting principle on its asserted
power to regulate when doing so is essential to a broader regulatory scheme. In
place of any constitutional limitation, the government attempts to distinguish the
health insurance business as “unique” in various respects. Br. for Appellants at 711.

But examining the “uniqueness” of the market being regulated and the

problems Congress chose to ameliorate is precisely the sort of inquiry into the
“more or less necessity” of a measure that the Supreme Court has always rejected.
In the course of pointing to one particular “unique” aspect of health care, the
government claims that the individual mandate is no different than requiring the
advance purchase of health care. Id. at 27. Nearly everyone ultimately consumes
health care—and consumption is clearly an economic act. Why then, the argument
goes, wouldn’t the Commerce Clause allow the federal government to direct that
health care be purchased now, by obtaining insurance, rather than later when the
medical bill comes due? Id. In other words, buying health insurance is just a
timing decision about when, not whether, to incur medical costs.
Instead of providing a constitutional limit on the power to impose economic
mandates, again the government invites a judicial examination of the “more or less
necessity” of congressional action:

Virtually all forms of insurance represent

timing decisions—paying up front for burial costs, loss of life, disability,
supplemental income, credit default, business interruption, and more. See Florida,
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2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *100-01 (discussing cost-shifting and timing
decisions in all insurance markets). Only a federal government of unbounded
powers could mandate that every American insure against such risks. “There will
be no stopping point if that should be deemed the equivalent of activity for
Commerce Clause purposes.” Id. at *102. And while it might be permissible to
penalize an uninsured person who shows up at a hospital or doctor’s office
demanding that his expenses be borne by the taxpayers, that is not what PPACA
does. Instead, PPACA penalizes all uninsured persons, not just those who seek to
be reimbursed by government for costs they should have borne themselves. Id. at
*72 n.14. And PPACA does more than mandate coverage; it also prescribes
certain provisions that each policy must include. Many Americans who prefer to
insure using, for example, Health Savings Accounts with high deductible coverage,
will be told by their federal overseers that such coverage isn’t adequate. Id.
The Supreme Court’s repeatedly affirmed requirement that there be a
constitutional limit on federal power cannot be side-stepped by invoking the
admitted importance of reforming health care or the cost-shifting aspects of that
market. Because the courts will defer to Congress’s assessment of the rationality
of addressing problems in the health care market, the retort that “health care is
different” provides no judicially administrable limit on the new power to impose
economic mandates on the people.

Indeed, if Congress can force otherwise
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inactive citizens to engage in economic transactions under the guise of regulating
commerce, the claimed “uniqueness” of health care is no limiting principle because
Congress has “plenary power” over “regulations of commerce.” Darby, 312 U.S.
at 115. A “plenary power” over inactive citizens is hardly limited by the one-off
exception the government urges here. By claiming that “health care is special” and
that the unique features of health care regulation justify the individual mandate, the
government ignores the unprecedented nature of the individual mandate and
instead offers a novel method of constitutional interpretation that would have
courts weighing how necessary a given measure is.
Striking down the individual mandate requires no such tortuous calculations
and would affect no other law ever enacted by Congress. “[T]he task is to identify
a mode of analysis that allows Congress to regulate more than nothing (by
declining to reduce each case to its litigants) and less than everything (by declining
to let Congress set the terms of analysis).” Raich, 545 U.S at 47-48 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting). Congress could have reformed the health care system in any number
of ways that may have been better or worse as a matter of policy—including the
adoption of a Medicare-for-Everyone “single payer” scheme—that would have
been legally unassailable under existing Commerce Clause doctrine. That it chose
this particular regulatory scheme does not make every provision essential to its
functioning automatically constitutional.
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B. Inactivity Is Not a Type of Activity
The government and the lower courts ruling in its favor have implicitly
acknowledged the requirement that Congress be regulating “activity” by redefining
that word to include the making of an “economic decision,” or a decision not to
act, or to remain uninsured, or numerous other “active” articulations of the status
of someone not owning health insurance. For example, in the most recent decision
upholding the individual mandate, a district court described the difference between
activity and inactivity as “pure semantics,” and held that Congress can regulate any
“mental activity, i.e., decision-making,” which has an ultimate economic effect.
Mead, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592, at *60. If a “decision” not to act is a
federally regulable action, however, then inactivity is transformed into activity by a
sort of linguistic alchemy that has at least three weaknesses.
First, the difference between activity and inactivity—or acts and
omissions—is a genuine and long-respected one. See, e.g., Prosser and Keeton on
the Law of Torts § 56 at 373 (5th ed. 1984) (“there runs through much of the law a
distinction between action and inaction.”). It is a basic principle of tort law, for
example, that one has no duty to act, and cannot generally be punished for
nonfeasance, but has only a duty to act reasonably, and not commit misfeasance.
This Court has recently reaffirmed this principle. Ironworkers Local Union 68 &
Participating Emplrs. Health & Welfare Funds v. AstraZeneca Pharms., LP, No.
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08-16851, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 4960, at *44 (11th Cir. Mar. 11, 2011). So, too,
in criminal law, one cannot generally be convicted without engaging in some type
of activity. United States v. Duran, 596 F.3d 1283, 1292-1293 (11th Cir. 2010).
The activity/inactivity distinction is intuitively obvious and well understood by the
ordinary person. It is also the foundation of moral philosophy relevant to debates
over health care law and policy. See, e.g., Philippa Foot, Killing and Letting Die,
in Moral Dilemmas 78-87 (2002) (distinguishing between prohibited killing and
allowable withholding of care). Contrary to the Mead court’s holding, it is the
redefinition of inactivity as a type of activity that is a semantic trick.
Second, while activity means engaging in a particular, definite act, inactivity
means not engaging in a literally infinite set of acts. At any instant, there are
innumerable economic transactions in which one is not entering.

To allow

Congress discretionary power to impose compulsory economic mandates within
this infinite set of inactions—without constitutional constraint—would amount to
granting the federal government a plenary and unlimited police power of the sort
the Constitution specifically withholds. See supra at 15; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
Finally, if inaction is deemed “economic” because of its economic effects,
then the distinction between economic and non-economic activity established in
Lopez and reaffirmed in Morrison and Raich would collapse. Indeed, Lopez and
Morrison stand for the proposition that Congress may not regulate intrastate non-
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economic activities even if, in the aggregate, they have substantial effects on
interstate commerce. But any class of activity or inactivity, in the aggregate, can
be said to have some economic consequences. To define inactivity as an economic
activity would destroy the line the Supreme Court has time and again drawn
between the intrastate economic activity that Congress may reach and the intrastate
non-economic activity it may not.

This Court should not so disregard the

overwhelming precedent governing the scope of the Commerce and Necessary and
Proper Clauses.

III.

The Individual Mandate Constitutes a “Commandeering of the
People” That Is Not “Proper” Under the Necessary and Proper
Clause

The Supreme Court, in two cases presenting then-unprecedented assertions
of power under the Commerce Clause, stated that Congress cannot use this power
to mandate or “commandeer” state legislatures and executive officers. Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992). As the Court explained, doing so would be “fundamentally incompatible
with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty,” and therefore improper under
our federalist system. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. The source of “residual state
sovereignty” is the Tenth Amendment, which reiterates that the Constitution
confers upon Congress “not all governmental powers, but only discrete,
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enumerated ones.” Id. at 919. The mandate at issue in Printz, even if necessary,
thus could not be justified under the Necessary and Proper Clause: “When a
‘la[w]…for carrying into Execution’ the Commerce Clause violates the principle
of state sovereignty reflected in” the Tenth Amendment and other constitutional
provisions, “it is not a ‘La[w] . . . proper for carrying into execution the Commerce
Clause.’” Id. at 923-24 (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18) (emphasis added).
But the Tenth Amendment also recognizes that the people of the United
States are sovereign: “The powers not delegated by the Constitution to the United
States, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or
to the people.” U.S. Const. amend. X (emphasis added). Just as mandating that
states take action is improper commandeering, so too is mandating that individual
citizens enter into transactions with private companies. This amounts to what Prof.
Barnett has recently called an improper “commandeering of the people.” See
generally Barnett, supra, at 621-34. In this way, the text of the Tenth Amendment
protects not just state sovereignty, but also popular sovereignty.
As Chief Justice John Jay noted in Chisholm v. Georgia, the people are
“truly the sovereigns of the country,” 2 U.S. (Dall.) 419, 471-72 (1793), and
elected officials merely their deputies, exercising a delegated authority. Fellow
Founder James Wilson agreed, recognizing that sovereignty starts with the
individual citizen: “If one free man, an original sovereign, may do all this; why
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may not an aggregate of free men, a collection of original sovereigns, do this
likewise?” Id. at 456 (emphasis added). Although the Eleventh Amendment
reversed the outcome of Chisholm and the Supreme Court has interpreted that
Amendment as establishing state sovereignty, the Court has never repudiated the
priority of popular sovereignty. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)
(“[I]n our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of
government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all
government exists and acts.”); accord Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967)
(“In our country the people are sovereign and the Government cannot sever its
relationship to the people by taking away their citizenship.”).
Thus, just as the Constitution disallows the “commandeering” of states as a
means of regulating interstate commerce, so too does it bar a “commandeering of
the people” for this purpose. What very few mandates are imposed on the people
by the federal government either derive from other clauses of the Constitution—
such as responding to censuses, U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, serving on juries, U.S.
Const. amend. VI & VII, or filing tax returns, U.S. Const. amend. XVI—or rest on
the fundamental pre-existing duties that citizens owe that government. See, e.g.,
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 378 (1918) (relying on the “supreme and
noble duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation” to
reject a Thirteenth Amendment claim).
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But citizens are not owned by the

government and cannot be generally presumed to be subject to an indefinite federal
command.

Various express provisions of the Constitution reflect this anti-

commandeering principle. For example, persons may not be mandated to quarter
soldiers in their homes in time of peace, to testify against themselves, to labor for
another, or to yield up other rights not specifically enumerated in the Constitution.
U.S. Const. amends. III, V, IX, XIII. In the United States, there is not even a duty
to vote. So there is certainly no comparable pre-existing “supreme and noble duty”
to engage in economic activity whenever doing so would be convenient to the
congressional regulation of interstate commerce. To hold otherwise would be to
deprive the people of the United States of the residual sovereignty recognized in
the Tenth Amendment and to make them the servants, rather than the masters, of
Congress.

Cf. The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) at 467 (Clinton

Rossiter, ed., 1961) (“[to say] that the legislative body are themselves the
constitutional judges of their own powers, and that the construction they put upon
them is conclusive upon other departments” would “be to affirm that the deputy is
greater than the principal; that the servant is above his master.”).
There are also pragmatic reasons to believe that the individual mandate is
not “proper.” In New York v. United States, Justice O’Connor explained that
mandates on states are improper because, “where the Federal Government directs
the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public
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disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may
remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.” 505 U.S. at
169. That proposition applies to the commandeering of individuals as well: the
individual mandate has allowed Congress and the president to escape political
accountability for what amounts to a tax increase on persons making less than
$250,000 per year by compelling them to make payments directly to private
companies. It is the evasion of political accountability that explains why the
mandate was formulated as a regulatory “requirement” enforced by a “penalty.”
The individual mandate crosses the fundamental line between limited
constitutional government and limitless power cabined only by the Congress’
political will—which is to say, not cabined at all. Congress would then be the sole
judge of the extent of its own authority—a proposition which the Founders
explicitly and repeatedly denied and which no federal court has ever endorsed.
In Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 617-18 (1870), for example,
the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that Congress is the sole judge of what
acts are necessary and proper to carrying out its enumerated powers. To admit that
Congress has such unreviewable discretion,
and, then, to exercise absolutely and without liability to question, in
cases involving private rights, the powers thus determined to [be
“necessary and proper”], would completely change the nature of
American government. It would convert the government, which the
people ordained as a government of limited powers, into a
government of unlimited powers…. It would obliterate every
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criterion which this court, speaking through the venerated Chief
Justice [Marshall] in [McCulloch], established for the determination
of the question whether legislative acts are constitutional or
unconstitutional.
If the word “proper” is to be more than dead letter, it must at least mean that
acts which destroy the very purpose of Article I—to enumerate and therefore limit
the powers of Congress—are improper. If the federal power to enact “economic
mandates” were upheld here, Congress would be free to require anything of the
citizenry so long as it was part of a national regulatory plan. Unsupported by any
fundamental, preexisting, or traditional duty of citizenship, imposing “economic
mandates” on the people is improper, both in the lay and constitutional senses of
that word. Allowing Congress to exercise such power would convert it from a
government of delegated powers into one of general and unlimited authority.

CONCLUSION
For the first time in American history, the federal government has attempted
to “commandeer the people” by imposing on them an “economic mandate” not
derived from pre-existing duties of citizenship. Such economic mandates cannot
be justified by existing Supreme Court doctrines defining and limiting the powers
of Congress.

Upholding the power to impose economic mandates “would

fundamentally alter the relationship of the federal government to the states and the
people; nobody would ever again be able to claim plausibly that the Constitution
28

limits federal power.” Ilya Shapiro, State Suits Against Health Reform Are Well
Grounded in Law—and Pose Serious Challenges, 29 Health Affairs 1229, 1232
(June 2010). It would turn citizens into subjects.
As one district court recognized, “[n]ever before has the Commerce Clause
and the associated Necessary and Proper Clause been extended this far.” Virginia
v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 612 (E.D. Va. 2010). Only the Supreme Court is
empowered to reconsider the outer bounds of federal power under the Commerce
and Necessary and Proper Clauses, and the district court properly interpreted the
existing doctrinal limits in this area. Accordingly, amicus respectfully asks this
court to affirm the district court.
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